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Abstract We consider the following version of the stable matching problem. Sup-
pose that men have preferences for women, women have preferences for dogs, and
dogs have preferences for men. The goal is to organize them into family units so that
no three of them have incentive to desert their assigned family members to join in
a new family. This problem is called circular stable matching, allegedly originated
by Knuth. We also investigate a generalized version of this problem, in which every
participant has preference among all others. The goal is similarly to partition them
into oriented triples so that no three persons have incentive to deviate from the as-
signment. This problem is motivated by recent innovations in kidney exchange, and
we call it the 3-way kidney transplant problem. We report complexity, structural and
counting results on these two problems.
1 Introduction
Stable matching problems were introduced by Gale and Shapley in their seminal pa-
per [6]. Knuth asked whether the stable matching problem can be extended to the case
of three parites [15], say we have women, men, and dogs. This fairly general problem
allows several formulations. One possibility is that every player expresses her/his/its
preference among the combinations of the other two parties. In this formulation, Ng
and Hirschberg [16] proved the existence of stable matchings is NP-complete. Similar
NP-completeness results have been shown in [10, 21].
Ng and Hirschberg mentioned that the reviewers of their paper suggest another
formulation, and they attributed it to Knuth, for the 3-party stable matchings—the
CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING problem that we will consider in this paper—women
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Fig. 1 An illustration of kidney exchange with compatibility as preference
have preferences for dogs, dogs have preferences for men, and men have preferences
for women. The goal is to organize them into stable family units so that people/dogs
have no incentive to desert their assigned family members to join in a new family.
This problem can be seen as a natural generalization of the well-known 2-party STA-
BLE MARRIAGE problem and have been investigated in [3, 5].
A generalized version of the CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING problem allows each
participant to express preference among all others. The goal is to partition 3n per-
sons into oriented triples so that no three of them have reasons to deviate from the
assignment. Again, this problem can be regarded as a generalization of the STABLE
ROOMMATES problem [6]. This generalized problem has practical interest in the kid-
ney exchange that has received much attention recently [1, 4, 8, 12, 17–20]. The
“preference” here can be interpreted as degrees of compatibility between recipients
and donors. Figure 1 gives a more visual way of seeing the connection between cir-
cular matching and kidney exchange. In this paper, we call this problem the 3-WAY
KIDNEY TRANSPLANT problem. For ease of presentation, we will refer to all partic-
ipants in both problems generically as “players.”
The two problems require a proper definition of stability. In the two-party STABLE
MARRIAGE and STABLE ROOMMATES, a matching is stable if there is no blocking
pair: two persons who strictly prefer each other to their assigned partners. Naturally,
one would extend blocking pairs into blocking triples to define the stability of match-
ings. However, a blocking triple here is more tricky. To see why this is so, consider
the following.
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– In CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING, suppose that we have a matching {(m1,w1, d1),
(m2,w2, d2), (m3,w3, d3)}. If m1 prefers w2 to w1, w2 prefers d3 to d2, and d3
prefers m1 to m3, then (m1,w2, d3) is clearly a blocking triple. But it may also
be the case that w2 prefers d1 to d2. Then (m1,w2, d1) can also be regarded as a
(weaker) blocking triple, since only m1 and w2 are really better off in such a triple,
while d1 is indifferent.
– In 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT, a matching is composed of oriented triples. Here
we write such a triple as (k1, k2, k3) to express that k2, k3, k1 are the successors
of k1, k2, k3, respectively. Moreover, here k1 represents a couple (often a married
couple) consisting of a person needing a new kidney and a potential kidney donor.
If k2 follows k1 in a triple, then the donor from the couple k2 will be passing a
kidney to the recipient of k1. Thus, it is k1’s preference (degree of compatibility)
that is at issue. Note that an oriented couple (k1, k2, k3) can be a blocking triple
itself (k1, k3, k2), if k1 prefers k3 to k2, k3 prefers k2 to k1, and k2 prefers k1 to k3.
Such phenomena may appear somehow surprising for researchers long familiar
with stable matching literature.
We allow players to express their indifferences in the form of ties in the prefer-
ence lists. Now we say a blocking triple is of degree i if i players are strictly better
off in such a triple than in a given matching, while the remaining 3 − i players are
indifferent. Note that the indifference can be either because the involved player is still
matched to the same partner (or still having the same successor in the oriented triple),
or because the involved player has a partner/successor who is tied with her/his/its
current assignment. We define a hierarchy of stabilities (which is similar to the one
defined by Irving [11] in the 2-party matching) as follows.
– Super Stable Matching: a matching not allowing blocking triples of degree 1 or 2
or 3.
– Strong Stable Matching: a matching not allowing blocking triples of degree 2 nor
those of degree 3.
– Weak Stable Matching: a matching not allowing blocking triples of degree 3.
Contributions of the Paper
Complexity: We prove the following existence problems are NP-complete: su-
per/strong stable matchings in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING; super/strong/weak
stable matchings in 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT. Therefore, it is unlikely that we
can design efficient algorithms to solve these problems. The complexity of weak sta-
ble matchings in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING remains open. However, there is
empirical evidence indicating that it probably does not belong to the class of NP-
complete problems. We shall discuss this issue later.
Independently, Biró and McDermid [2] obtained similar NP-completeness results
for both of problems studied in this work.
Structural Results: It is well-known that stable matchings in 2-party stable marriage
and stable roommates have rich structures and sophisticated algorithms have been de-
signed to exploit them [9, 15]. It turns out that strong stable matchings in CIRCULAR
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STABLE MATCHING have parallel (but even richer) structures. Briefly, we show that
the set of strong stable matchings form a union of distributive lattices.
Counting Results: We prove that counting strong stable matchings in both problems
is #P-complete. Moreover, the number of strong and weak stable matchings in both
problems can be exponential.
Notation and Paper Roadmap
In the paper, we use M, W , D to denote the collections of men and women and
dogs in CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING. Whatever the problem instance, we will
always assume that they are of the same cardinality. Similarly, K means the set of
players in 3-way kidney transplant. P(p) denotes the preference list of player p.
The notation  indicates the preference order in the list. The braces denote a tie.
For example, P(m) = {w1,w2}  w3 means that man m prefers both w1 and w2 to
w3 while he is indifferent between the former two. In general, we use μ to denote a
3-dimensional matching (consisted of triples). We will need to consider the induced
two-party matching of μ. For example, we write μ|M,W to denote the induced men-
women matching by dropping all dogs from the triples of μ. Finally, πr(X) denotes
an arbitrary permutation of the members in the set X.
Section 2 presents complexity results; Sect. 3 reports structural results of stable
matching; Sect. 4 concerns the counting of stable matchings. Finally, Sect. 5 draws
conclusions.
2 NP-completeness of Strong Stable Matchings
The reductions we will present share similar ideas to those used in [10]. The main
difference lies in the design of “guard players” (to be explained below).
2.1 Existence Problem of Super Stable Matchings is NP-complete
To prove that the existence of super stable matchings is NP-complete in circular
stable matching, we present a reduction from 3-DIMENSIONAL MATCHING, one of
Karp’s 21 NP-complete problems [14]. The problem instance is given in the form
ϒ = (M, W, D, T ), where T ⊆ M × W × D. The goal is to decide whether a per-
fect matching μ ⊆ T exists. This problem remains NP-complete even if every player
in M ∪ W ∪ D appears exactly 2 or 3 times in the triples of T [7].
We first explain the intuition behind our reduction. Supposing that man mi ap-
pears in three triples (mi,wia, dia), (mi,wib, dib), (mi,wic, dic) in T , we create
three dopplegangers, mi1, mi2, mi3 in the derived circular stable matching instance






i2. The aim of
our design is that in the derived instance ϒ ′, in a super stable matching, exactly one
doppleganger will be matched to a woman-dog pair with whom mi shares a triple
in T , while the other two dopplegangers will be paired off with garbage collectors.
In the case that there are only two triples in T containing man mj , we create only
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Table 1 The preference lists of all players in the derived instance ϒ ′ . Recall that { } denotes a tie in
the preferences. Note also that real women W and real dogs D only list real dogs and dopplegangers,
respectively, with whom they share triples in T , at the top of their lists
Major players Preference lists
mi1 ∈ M1 {wgi1,w
g
i2,wia}  w(mi1)  · · ·
mi2 ∈ M2 {wgi1,w
g
i2,wib}  w(mi2)  · · ·
mi3 ∈ M3 {wgi1,w
g
i2,wic}  w(mi3)  · · ·
w ∈ W {d|(∗,w,d) ∈ T }  d(w)  · · ·























1 {mi1,mi2,mi3}  m(d
g





2 {mi1,mi2,mi3}  m(d
g
i2)  · · ·
Guard players Preference lists
m(m†),m† ∈ M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3 w(m†)  · · ·
w(m†),m† ∈ M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3 d(m†)  · · ·
d(m†),m† ∈ M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3 {m†,m(m†)}  · · ·
m(w†),w† ∈ W g1 ∪ W
g
2 ∪ W {w†,w(w†)}  · · ·
w(w†),w† ∈ W g1 ∪ W
g
2 ∪ W d(w†)  · · ·
d(w†),w† ∈ W g1 ∪ W
g
2 ∪ W m(w†)  · · ·
m(d†), d† ∈ Dg1 ∪ D
g
2 ∪ D w(d†)  · · ·
w(d†), d† ∈ Dg1 ∪ D
g
2 ∪ D {d(d†), d†}  · · ·
d(d†), d† ∈ Dg1 ∪ D
g
2 ∪ D m(d†)  · · ·
2 dopplegangers mj1,mj2 and two garbage collectors wgj1, d
g
j1. Similarly, the intent
is to make sure that in a super stable matching, exactly one doppleganger will be
matched to a woman-dog pair with whom mj shares a triple in T while the other is
matched to the garbage collectors.
Now, we will refer to the set of dopplegangers as M1, M2, M3, the set of garbage
collectors as W g1 , W g2 , Dg1 , Dg2 and the original set of real women and real dogs as
W, D. Collectively, we refer to them as major players  = M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3 ∪ W g1 ∪
W g2 ∪ W ∪ Dg1 ∪ Dg2 ∪ D and their preferences are summarized in the left column of
Table 1.
To restrict the possible partners of major players in , we introduce a set of gad-
gets called guard players. They are denoted as m(p),w(p), d(p), for p ∈  and
their preferences are shown in the right column of Table 1. Their purpose is to ensure
that player p, say p = mi1, will never get a partner ranking lower than his associ-
ated guard player w(mi1) in a super stable matching. How guard players and major
players interact is captured by the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In the derived instance ϒ ′, if a super stable matching exists, then in such
a matching, (1) all major players in  will be matched to other major players rank-
ing higher than her/his/its associated guard players, (2) the set of guard players
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m(p),w(p), d(p), where p ∈  are matched to one another, and (3) the garbage
collectors created for a particular man mi will be matched to one another and the
two dopplegangers of mi (or just one if mi only appears twice in the triples of the
given 3-dimensional matching instance ϒ ).
Proof Without loss of generality, consider the major player p = mi1. In a su-
per stable matching, if mi1 is matched to a woman ranking below w(mi1), then
(mi1,w(mi1), d(mi1)) is a blocking triple of degree at least 1, a contradiction. If
mi1 is matched to w(mi1), then (m(mi1),w(mi1), d(mi1)) is a blocking triple of
degree at least 1, again a contradiction.
For the second part, by the above discussion, we know that all major players must
be matched to one another. Hence, if (m(p),w(p), d(p)) is not part of a super
stable matching, they form a blocking triple of degree at least 1.
The third part follows straightforwardly from the previous two. 
Lemma 2 The given instance ϒ = (M, W, D, T ) contains a perfect matching if and
only if the derived instance ϒ ′ allows a super stable matching.
Proof (Sufficiency) If the derived instance ϒ ′ allows a super stable matching, then
by the third part of Lemma 1, it is easy to see that ϒ contains a perfect matching.
(Necessity) Suppose that μ is a perfect matching in ϒ . We construct a super stable
matching μ′ for the derived instance ϒ ′ as follows. Assuming that (mi,wx, dy) ∈ μ,
we choose the doppleganger mij who ranks wx higher than his guard player w(mij )
and make (mij ,wx, dy) a triple in μ′. Further, the other two dopplegangers of mi are






i2) respectively. (If there are only two dopplegangers
of mi , then the other doppleganger mij ′ = mij is matched to wgi1, dgi1.) Finally, let the
three guard players created for a particular major player be matched to one another.
By this construction, it can be verified that we only allow blocking triples of degree
0, which are permissible for a super stable matching. 
Theorem 1 Deciding whether a super stable matching exists in a circular stable
matching problem with ties in the preferences is NP-complete. This is true even if all
ties are of size at most 3 and they are at the front of the preference lists.
To prove the existence of strong stable matching is NP-complete, we can use the
same reduction as above with just one alteration: we need a different set of guard
players for each major player. Note that in the proof of Lemma 1, we rely on blocking
triples of degree 1; those are not counted as blocking triples based on the definition
of strong stable matching.
The design of guard players for the reduction of strong stable matching is similar
to those used in a reduction in Sect. 2.3, so we omit the details here.1
1However, in our reduction, ties are allowed. Biró and McDermid gave a stronger reduction showing that
the existence of strong stable matchings is NP-complete even with strictly-ordered preference lists.
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2.2 Strong/Super Stability in 3-way Kidney Transplant
We now present a reduction from a circular stable matching instance ϒ = (M, W,
D, L) (with or without ties in the preferences) to a 3-way kidney transplant in-
stance ϒ ′. Suppose that m ∈ M,w ∈ W, d ∈ D have preferences P(m),P (w),P (d),
respectively. In ϒ ′, their preferences are transformed into
– P ′(m) = P(m)  πr(D)  πr(M − {m}).
– P ′(w) = P(w)  πr(M)  πr(W − {w}).
– P ′(d) = P(d)  πr(W)  πr(D − {d}).
To prove this is a valid reduction, we have to argue that strong/super stable match-
ings exist in ϒ if and only if they exist in ϒ ′. It is straightforward to show one
direction (from ϒ to ϒ ′), but the other direction takes some argument.
Lemma 3 If a strong/super stable matching μ′ exists in ϒ ′, the following holds
– Every oriented triple contains exactly one man, one woman, and one dog.
– Given a triple t ∈ μ′, t’s orientation must be t = (m,w,d).
Proof For the first part, without loss of generality, assume that a triple t ∈ μ′ contains
at least two men. There are three possible cases and all lead to contradiction.
1. Suppose that t = (m,m′,m′′). Then there exist two triples t ′ and t ′′, which contain
two women and two dogs, respectively. As a result, a woman w ∈ t ′ and a dog
d ∈ t ′′ have as successors a woman, and a dog, respectively. Similarly, there is a
man m ∈ t whose successor is another man. Then (m,w,d) is a blocking triple of
degree 3, violating the stability of μ′.
2. Suppose that t = (m,m′,w). Then there exists a triple t ′ containing two dogs. At
least one dog d ∈ t ′ has another dog as successor. Then (m,w,d) is a blocking
triple of degree 3, blocking μ′.
3. Suppose that t = (m,m′, d). Then the argument is analogous to the previous case.
For the second part, if t = (m,d,w) ∈ μ′, then the reverse triple (m,w,d) is a
blocking triple of degree 3. 
By Lemma 3, the following theorem is immediate.
Theorem 2 It is NP-complete to decide whether a strong/super stable matching ex-
ists in the 3-way kidney transplant problem.
2.3 Weak Stability in 3-way Kidney Transplant
The reduction we are presenting in this section shares similar basic ideas to those
we used in Sect. 2.1: reduction from a 3-dimensional matching problem instance
ϒ = (M, W, D, L), creating dopplegangers M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3 and garbage collectors
W g1 ∪ W g2 ∪ Dg1 ∪ Dg2 , and using sets of guard players to restrict the potential partners
(successors in triples) of the major players. The key difference is the design of the
guard players’ preferences.
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We introduce the following gadget for each major player k ∈ M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3 ∪
W g1 ∪ W g2 ∪ Dg1 ∪ Dg2 . (Note that real women W and real dogs D do not need them.)
Let ϒk be a 3-way kidney transplant instance that has the following three properties:
(1) It contains 7 players, k#i ,1 ≤ i ≤ 7, (2) it does not allow any weak stable matching,
and (3) if one player, k#1 , is removed from ϒk , then the remaining 6 players’ prefer-
ences allow at least one weak stable matching. Such an instance ϒk can be found in
Appendix A. Our plan is to “embed” instances ϒk into the intended 3-way kidney
transplant instance ϒ ′.
We now explain in more detail what we mean by embedding of ϒk into ϒ ′. For
illustration, we first show the preferences of mi1 and his six associated guard players
in ϒ ′.
– Pϒ ′(mi1) = wgi2  wgi1  wia  Pϒmi1 (m#i1,1)  · · · , where Pϒmi1 (m#i1,1) is the
preference list of m#i1,1 in the instance ϒmi1 .
– Pϒ ′(m#i1,j ) = Pϒmi1 (m#i1,j )  · · · , where 2 ≤ j ≤ 7 and Pϒmi1 (m#i1,j ) is the prefer-
ence list of m#i1,j in the instance ϒmi1 .
In words, as k = mi1, we let mi1 “play the role” of k#1(= m#i1,1). His associated six
guard players in ϒk(= ϒmi1) are added into ϒ ′ and, in their new preferences, they
still put one another on top of their lists. By this arrangement, if mi1 can be matched
to some woman ranking higher than his associated guard players, then in this sense,
m#i1,1(= mi1) is removed from the problem instance ϒmi1 ; on the other hand, if he is
not, then ϒmi1 will engender at least a blocking triple, disrupting the stability of the
matching in ϒ ′.
Lemma 4 In a weak stable matching μ′ in ϒ ′, the successor of mi1 ranks at least as
high as wia . Moreover, the six guard players of mi1 must be matched to one another.
Proof If mi1 is matched to someone ranking lower than wia , then whatever the ori-
ented triples of μ′ involving the six guard partners of mi1 and mi1 himself, the situa-
tion is identical to one where we have a matching μφ for the problem instance ϒmi1 ,
which by design, involves at least one blocking triple of degree 3 to block μφ , and
also μ′. The second part of the lemma follows from the first part and the way we
chose the gadget ϒk(= ϒmi1). 
The detailed preferences of major players can be found in Table 2. Note that
Lemma 4 also applies to other major players who have associated guard players.
Thus, in a weak stable matching, they will get a successor ranking strictly higher
than their guard players.
Theorem 3 Deciding whether a weak stable matching exists in a 3-way kidney trans-
plant problem is NP-complete.
Proof By Lemma 4, if μ′ is a weak stable matching in ϒ ′, we can throw away triples
involving guard players of ϒ ′, along with the garbage collectors (and the dopple-
gangers matched to them). Replace the doppleganger mij with the real man mi gives
the desired perfect matching μ in ϒ .
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Table 2 The preference lists of major players in the derived problem instance ϒ ′
Players Preference lists Players Preference lists
mi1 ∈ M1 wgi2  w
g










i1,1)  · · ·
mi2 ∈ M2 wgi2  w
g










i2,1)  · · ·
mi3 ∈ M1 wgi2  w
g











i1,1)  · · ·
w ∈ W πr ({d|(∗,w,d) ∈ T })  · · · dgi2 ∈ D
g







i2,1)  · · ·
d ∈ D πr ({mij |mij ∈ M1 ∪ M2 ∪ M3})  · · ·
For the other direction, we will construct a weak stable matching μ′ in ϒ ′ based
on a perfect matching μ in ϒ . Suppose that (mi,wx, dy) ∈ μ. In μ′, we insert three
triples, (mij ,wx, dy), where mij is the doppleganger of mi who ranks wx higher than








i2). (Or we only add the first
two triples, provided that mi only appears twice in the triples of T .) It can be observed
that μ′ involves only blocking triples of degree at most 2, which are allowed because
of the definition of weak stable matchings. 
3 Structures of Strong Stable Matchings
We first review the definition of distributive lattices.
Definition 1 Let (E,
) be a poset. Such a poset is a distributive lattice if it fulfills
the following three properties:
1. Each pair of elements a, b ∈ E has an infimum, called meet, denoted as a ∧ b ∈ E ,
such that a∧b 
 a, a∧b 
 b, and there is no element c ∈ E such that c 
 a, c 
 b,
and a ∧ b  c.
2. Each pair of elements a, b ∈ E has a supremum, called join, denoted as a ∨ b ∈ E ,
such that a 
 a∨b, b 
 a∨b, and there is no element c ∈ E such that a 
 c, b 
 c,
and c  a ∨ b.
3. Given any three elements, a, b, c ∈ E , the distributive law holds, i.e., a ∧ (b∨ c) =
(a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c), and a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c).
Note that in this section, we assume that all preference lists are strictly ordered.
Our major finding regarding the structure of strong stable matchings in CIRCULAR
STABLE MATCHING is that they are a collection of distributive lattices. In particular,
consider the subset of strong stable matchings in which all players in one group (men,
women, or dogs) have the same partners. Such a subset is a distributive lattice. The
following theorem gives a more precise statement.
Theorem 4 Let ϒ = (M, W, D, P) be a circular stable matching instance and let
the set of strong stable matchings in ϒ be denoted as . Given a two-party matching
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NP,Q = {(pi1, qi1), (pi2, qi2), . . . , (pin, qin)} where pij = pij ′ , qij = qij ′ , pij ∈ P ,
qij ∈ Q, P, Q ∈ {M, W, D}, P = Q, the subset of strong stable matchings NP,Q ={μ|μ ∈ ,μ|P,Q = NP,Q} is a distributive lattice.
We make two remarks here. First, when we consider a non-empty subset NP,Q =
NM,W of strong stable matchings, we impose a partial order on the elements based
on the welfare of one particular group, which, in this case, is W . (Note that all men
M are doing the same in all strong stable matchings in NM,W .) Thus, if μ,μ′ ∈
NM,W , then μ  μ′ if and only if all women in W are getting dogs in μ ranking at
least as high as those they get in μ′. Second, if NP,Q = ∅, we are assuming that it
is (vacuously) a distributive lattice.
Lemma 5 Let μ and μ′ be two strong stable matchings in ND,M and man m and
woman w belong to the same triple in μ but not so in μ′. Then one of them prefers μ
while the other prefers μ′.
Proof Let X , Y be the sets of men and women preferring μ respectively; analo-
gously, let X ′, Y ′ be the set of men and women preferring μ′ respectively.
We claim that if m ∈ X , then his partner w in μ must be a member of Y ′. If this
is not so, then (m,w,d) blocks μ′, where d is the dog that has m as a partner in both
μ and μ′. Thus, we have |X | ≤ |Y ′|. By an analogous argument, every man m in X ′
must have a woman w ∈ Y as a partner in μ′, otherwise, (m,w,d) blocks μ, where
d is the dog that has m as a partner in both μ and μ′. So we have |X ′| ≤ |Y|.
By the fact that in both μ and μ′, all dogs have the same partners, so the number
of men and women having different partners must be equal: |X | + |X ′| = |Y| + |Y ′|.
This, combined with the previous two facts, |X | ≤ |Y ′| and |X ′| ≤ |Y|, implies that
|X | = |Y ′|, |X | = |Y ′|. Now if every man in X has a woman in Y ′ as a partner in μ,
then every man in X ′ must have a woman in Y in μ. This gives us the lemma. 
Lemma 6 Let μ and μ′ be two strong stable matchings in ND,M . If all men are
given the better partners in the two matching μ and μ′, then the resultant matching,
denoted as μ ∧ μ′, is also a strong stable matching in ND,M .
Proof We first need to argue that μ ∧ μ′ is really a matching. Suppose, for a contra-
diction, that both m and m′ are matched to w in μ∧μ′. Without loss of generality, let
m and m′ be matched to w in μ and μ′, respectively. By Lemma 5, since m prefers
matching μ, then w must prefer μ′. This, combined with the fact that m′ also prefers
w to his partner in μ, implies that (m′,w,d ′), where dog d ′ always has m′ as a partner
in ND,M is a blocking triple of degree 2 in μ, a contradiction.
We now argue the stability of μ ∧ μ′. Suppose that (m,w,d) is a blocking triple
of degree 3. Without loss of generality, let m′ be the man who gets w as a partner in
μ and he prefers (or is indifferent to) μ. In μ, w also strictly prefers d to her assigned
dog partner d ′, who always has m′ as a partner in ND,M , in μ. It is easy to see that
man m and dog d prefers w and m, respectively, to their assigned partner in both μ
and μ′. Therefore, (m,w,d) is a blocking triple of degree 3 in μ, a contradiction.
Finally, suppose (m,w,d) is a blocking triple of degree 2 to μ ∧ μ′. There are
three cases to consider and their arguments are similar. We consider only one case.
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Suppose m is the player who is indifferent. Let μ be the matching in which m is
matched to w and m prefers (or is indifferent to) μ. Then (m,w,d) is also a blocking
triple of degree 2 in μ, a contradiction. 
The lemma below follows analogous arguments to those in the preceding one.
Lemma 7 Let μ and μ′ be two strong stable matchings in ND,M . If all women are
given the better partners in the two matching μ and μ′, then the resultant matching,
denoted as μ ∨ μ′, is a strong stable matching in ND,M .
Now, armed with Lemmas 6 and 7, we can introduce the lemma that establishes
the distributive law of the lattice.
Lemma 8 Let μ, μ′ and μ′′ be three strong stable matchings in ND,M . Then μ ∧
(μ′ ∨ μ′′) = (μ ∧ μ′) ∨ (μ ∧ μ′′) and μ ∨ (μ′ ∧ μ′′) = (μ ∨ μ′) ∧ (μ ∨ μ′′).
Proof Lemmas 6 and 7 establish that meet and join operations result in a strong stable
matching in ND,M . The distributive law can be easily verified. 
The correctness of Theorem 4 follows from Lemmas 6, 7 and 8.
4 #P-completeness of Strong Stable Matchings
In this section, we present a reduction from the 2-party STABLE MARRIAGE prob-
lem to the 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT problem. Counting the number of stable
matchings in a stable marriage instance is #P-complete, a fact established by Irving
and Leather [13].
To build up some intuition, we first show how to “embed” a STABLE MAR-
RIAGE instance ϒ = (M, W, P) into a CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING instance
ϒ ′ = (M′, W ′, D′, P ′). For each player p ∈ M ∪ W , we create a player p′ and
add her/him/it into the derived instance ϒ ′. Suppose a man m′i ∈ M′ is created
based on mi ∈ M. We let him have the same preference as mi . Precisely, suppos-
ing that P(mi) = wi1  wi2  · · ·  win, let P ′(m′i ) = w′i1  w′i2  · · ·  w′in. Fur-
thermore, for each man m′i ∈ M ′, we create a dog d ′i and add it into D′ with pref-
erence P ′(d ′i ) = m′i  · · · . For a woman w′i ∈ W ′, her preference is now for dogs,
moreover, in her new preference, the indices are kept the same. To be precise, if
P(wi) = mi1  mi2  · · ·  min, we make P(w′i ) = d ′i1  d ′i2  · · ·  d ′in.
By this construction, it is easy to observe that the matching μ = {(mj1,wj1),
(mj2,wj2), . . . , (mjn,wjn)} is stable in ϒ if and only if the matching μ′ =
{(m′j1,w′j1, d ′j1), (m′j2,w′j2, d ′j2), . . . , (m′jn,w′jn, d ′jn)} is strongly stable in ϒ ′.
A blocking pair (mjk,wjl) in the former implies a blocking triple (m′jk,w′j l, d ′jk) of
degree 2 in the latter. Conversely, there cannot be a blocking triple of degree 3 in μ′
(since every dog is matched to its top-ranked man). A blocking triple (m′jk,w′j l, d ′jk)
of degree 2 implies that (mjk,wjl) blocks μ as well.
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From the fact that the number of stable matchings in STABLE MARRIAGE can
be exponential (see Knuth’s book [15]), the fact that weak stable matchings are a
superset of strong stable matchings, and the reduction given in Sect. 2.2, we establish:
Theorem 5 The number of weak and strong stable matchings in circular stable
matching and 3-way kidney transplant problems can be exponential.
Unfortunately, the above construction of ϒ ′ is not a reduction, instead, it is merely
an embedding. There is no guarantee that some other strong stable matching (in which
dogs are not always matched to their top-ranked men) will not arise in ϒ ′. To prove
the #P-completeness, we need one more twist.
We transform ϒ ′ into a 3-WAY KIDNEY TRANSPLANT INSTANCE ϒ ′′ = (K′′, L′′)
as follows. We first make a copy of every player in M′ ∪ W ′ ∪ D′ and add it into K′′.
For each dog d ′′i ∈ K′′, we create a set of guard players to restrict its possible succes-
sors in a strong stable matching. The idea here is similar to the one we used in the
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into ϒ ′′ by altering the preferences of d ′′i and its associated three
guard players as follows.
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in the instance ϒd ′′i .
The intent here is to try to remove one player, d ′′i (who plays the role of k#d ′′i ,1)
from ϒd ′′i to prevent a potential blocking triple in ϒd ′′i from blocking a strong stable
matching in ϒ ′′.
After adding the 3n guard players into K′′, we also have to update the preferences
of the men and women who are the copies of those in M′ ∪ W ′. Such a player, say,
m′′i , replaces each woman w′j ∈ W ′ with w′′j in his list and attaches other players to
the end of his list.
It can be checked that in all strong stable matchings in ϒ ′′, dogs have their top-
ranked men as successors. Moreover, a matching μ = {(mj1,wj1), (mj2,wj2), . . . ,
(mjn,wjn)} is stable in ϒ if and only if a matching μ′′ = {(m′′j1,w′′j1, d ′′j1),
(m′′j2,w′′j2, d ′′j2), . . . , (m′′jn,w′′jn, d ′′jn)} is strongly stable in ϒ ′′. Therefore, the reduc-
tion from ϒ to ϒ ′′ is correct. Using a similar and slightly more complicated gadget
(of guard players), it is also possible to have a reduction from ϒ to an instance of
CIRCULAR STABLE MATCHING. We omit it here.
We conclude this section with the following theorem.
Theorem 6 It is #P-complete to count the number of strong stable matchings in both
circular stable matching and 3-way kidney transplant problems.
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5 Conclusion
We have left a complexity issue unanswered: existence of a weak stable circular
matching. We were unable to come up with a NP-complete reduction, for there is
no similar gadget (a small instance allowing no weak stable matchings) to the one
we used in Sect. 2.3. Indeed, the reason may go deeper. Empirical evidence indicates
that the number of weak stable circular matchings grows extraordinarily fast with
the problem size. Eriksson, Sjöstrand and Strimling [5] conjectured that weak sta-
ble matchings always exist. This is why we remarked previously that finding one is
probably not NP-complete.
Interestingly, Biró and McDermid [2] designed a small instance without weak
stable matchings—under the assumption that players can truncate their preference
lists. They were thus able to prove that the existence of weak stable matchings is also
NP-complete in this context.
The obvious open questions are: when preferences are required to be complete, is
there an instance in which no weak stable matchings exist? And if there is no such
instance, is there a technique to prove their perennial existence.
Acknowledgement I thank Peter Winkler for many helpful discussions.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Noncom-
mercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
Appendix A: Examples of Small 3-way Kidney Transplant Instances Without
Stable Matchings
We mentioned in Sects. 2.3 and 5 that in the reductions, we need 3-WAY KIDNEY
TRANSPLANT instances without weak/strong stable matchings. Two such instances
are given in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.
Table 3 A 3-way kidney
transplant instance of size 7




2  k#5  k#4  k#6  k#3  k#7
k#2 k
#
4  k#1  k#6  k#3  k#5  k#7
k#3 k
#
7  k#2  k#6  k#1  k#4  k#5
k#4 k
#
5  k#6  k#3  k#7  k#1  k#2
k#5 k
#
6  k#7  k#4  k#1  k#3  k#2
k#6 k
#
3  k#2  k#1  k#4  k#5  k#7
k#7 k
#
2  k#4  k#5  k#3  k#6  k#1
Table 4 A 3-way kidney
transplant instance of size 4




3  k#2  k#4
k#2 k
#
4  k#1  k#3
k#3 k
#
4  k#1  k#2
k#4 k
#
3  k#2  k#1
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